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During December 12–29, 1998, seven patients ages 2–18 years were diagnosed with serogroup C menin-
gococcal disease in two neighboring Florida towns with 33,000 residents. We evaluated a mass vaccina-
tion campaign implemented to control the outbreak. We maintained vaccination logs and recorded the
resources used in the campaign that targeted 2- to 22-year-old residents of the two towns. A total of
13,148 persons received the vaccinations in 3 days. Vaccination coverage in the target population was
estimated to be 86% to 99%. Five additional cases of serogroup C meningococcal disease occurred in the
community during the year after the campaign began, four in patients who had not received the vaccine.
The cost of control efforts was approximately $370,000. Although cases continued to occur, the vaccina-
tion campaign appeared to control the outbreak. Rapid implementation, a targeted approach, and high
coverage were important to the campaign's success.
eisseria meningitidis is a leading cause of bacterial men-
ingitis and sepsis in children and young adults in the
United States (1,2). An estimated 2,600 cases occur each year,
most of them sporadic (2). Between 10 and 15 outbreaks of
meningococcal disease are reported in the country annually
(1,3). Outbreaks can occur in institutions as well as in commu-
nities. Communitywide outbreaks can persist for several
months, and controlling them remains a major challenge in
public health (4–6). 
The primary method for preventing sporadic meningococ-
cal disease is chemoprophylaxis of close contacts after a case
is identified (1,7,8). However, the protective effect of chemo-
prophylaxis is of limited duration (6,9,10).
A quadrivalent polysaccharide meningococcal vaccine
effective against N. meningitidis serogroup A, C, W135, and Y
is available in the United States (7,11). Serogroup C N. menin-
gitidis accounts for most U.S. outbreaks (3). The Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) has released
recommendations for the use of meningococcal vaccine to
control outbreaks of serogroup C meningococcal disease (11). 
Identifying the need for a vaccination campaign, defining
the target population, implementing the campaign rapidly, and
achieving high vaccination coverage are difficult (5). Mass
vaccination campaigns require major logistic efforts and often
take place in an atmosphere of public anxiety (5,6,12,13). Few
local and state health departments have much experience in
responding to such outbreaks. Mass vaccination campaigns in
response to meningococcal disease outbreaks have been
reported before, but only limited information is available on
the operational aspects of such efforts (4,5,9,14).
In December 1998, two neighboring towns with a com-
bined population of 33,000 persons in Putnam County, Florida,
had a community outbreak of meningococcal disease (1,3).
The health department administered chemoprophylaxis to
close contacts of the case-patients and investigated links
between patients. Detailed results of the investigation have
been described elsewhere (15). On December 29, 1998, the
decision was made to implement a mass vaccination campaign
to control the outbreak in the community, based on ACIP rec-
ommendations (7). We describe the epidemiology of the out-
break and the methods used for providing chemoprophylaxis
and implementing the vaccination campaign. We also evaluate
the results and the cost of the control efforts.
Materials and Methods
Case Definition
A case-patient was defined as a person in Putnam County
with onset of clinically compatible illness after November
1998 and isolation of serogroup C N. meningitidis obtained
from a normally sterile site or detection of serogroup C menin-
gococcal polysaccharide antigen in the cerebrospinal fluid or
serum (7). Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) was per-
formed on culture-confirmed isolates in the state health depart-
ment laboratory by using previously described methods
(16,17).
Chemoprophylaxis
Chemoprophylaxis—rifampin, ciprofloxacin, or ceftriax-
one, as recommended by ACIP (7)—was given to close con-
tacts. A close contact was defined as a household member,
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day-care center contact, or anyone directly exposed to the
patient’s oral secretion (7,18). We documented all chemopro-
phylaxis provided by the health department for the first nine
patients and retrospectively verified whether the persons who
had received prophylaxis met the definition of a close contact.
Vaccination Campaign
The decision to implement the vaccination campaign was
based on ACIP guidelines for community-based outbreaks (7).
We defined the population at risk as the population of the two
neighboring towns since this area represented the smallest
geographically contiguous population that included all case-
patients. The target population for the vaccination campaign
was defined as all residents ages 2–22 years.
The vaccination campaign took place December 30–31,
1998, and January 2, 1999. Additional vaccinations were
offered at the health department by appointment until January
20, 1999, for those who belonged to the target group but did
not receive the vaccine during the 3-day campaign.
We organized a single-site immunization clinic in the high
school cafeteria. We used Menommune quadrivalent polysac-
charide meningococcal vaccine (Aventis Pasteur [formerly
Pasteur Merieux Connaught], Swiftwater, PA) in 50-dose vials
originally designed for jet injector use. All adult vaccinees
signed a consent form before being vaccinated. A parental
consent was required for vaccinees <18 years of age.
Public Information
Staff of the county health department, the state health
department, and the school administration received question-
and-answer sheets to respond to telephone inquiries from the
public. The state health department installed a toll-free phone
number with automated information on the vaccination cam-
paign and posted additional information on the Internet.
Health department staff held daily press conferences from
December 30, 1998, through January 2, 1999.
Vaccination Coverage
We maintained vaccination logs during the campaign, in
which we documented age, sex, and address of the vaccinee as
well as date of vaccination. To determine the reliability of the
address information in the log, we selected a random sample
from the vaccinees listed in the log. We validated the address
information with the school enrollment database of the county.
Only addresses of persons identified in both databases were
compared. The size of the population at risk and the target
population was determined by using 1998 official Florida pop-
ulation figures provided by the Bureau of Economic and Busi-
ness Research at the University of Florida.
Cost of the Intervention
We recorded expenditures for health department staff time
and material resources associated with the efforts to control
the outbreak. We did not include salaries for police and fire
department personnel, local health-care providers, or the value
of time and services donated by volunteers.
Results
Outbreak Investigation
During December 14–26, 1998, four female and three male
case-patients of serogroup C meningococcal disease were
reported to the health department of Putnam County (Table 1).
Their ages ranged from 2 to 18 years (median 12). Two of the
patients had close contact with each other so that the primary
disease attack rate was 15 per 100,000. The county had
received an average of one report of meningococcal disease
per year in 1988–1998.
Table 1. Cases of serogroup C meningococcal disease, Putnam County, Florida, 1998–1999a




chemoprophylaxis Received vaccine  PFGE Outcome
12/12/98 F 2 yrs Yes No No No isolate No sequelae
12/12/98 F 18 yrs Yes No No Identical No sequelae
12/18/98 M 12 yrs Yes No No Identical No sequelae
12/25/98 F 2 yrs Yes No  No Identical No sequelae
12/25/98 F 4 yrs Yes No No Identical No sequelae
12/26/98 M 11 yrs Yes No No Identical No sequelae
12/26/98 M 12 yrs Yes No No No isolate No sequelae
12/29/98 M 18 yrs Yes No No Identical Died
01/03/99 M 25 yrs Yes Yes No Identical No sequelae
3/25/99 M 17 yrs No No No Identical No sequelae
5/12/99 F 6 yrs Yes Yes Yes 3 bands different Necrosis of ear lobe
12/28/99 F 3 mo Yes No No Identical Died
aPFGE, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis; M, male; F, female.RESEARCH
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One case occurred the night before the campaign started.
After the campaign began, four additional cases (two female,
two male) of serogroup C meningococcal disease occurred
until December 1999; ages of patients ranged from 3 months
to 25 years (Table 1). One of the patients with onset in January
1999 had received chemoprophylaxis. Another patient, whose
onset was in May, had received both chemoprophylaxis and
vaccine. The other postcampaign patients had not received
vaccine. PFGE performed on isolates from 10 of 12 patients
showed identical patterns for the first eight isolates. The iso-
lates from the three case-patients in March, May, and Decem-
ber 1999 differed by three or fewer bands from the earlier
outbreak strains (Table 1).
Chemoprophylaxis
The health department gave chemoprophylaxis to a total of
484 contacts, ranging from 7 to 108 contacts per patient. Three
hundred six (63%) of those who received chemoprophylaxis
were considered close contacts according to ACIP criteria (7). 
Vaccination Campaign
Law enforcement personnel from the local sheriff’s depart-
ment provided crowd and traffic control. Volunteers and cleri-
cal staff served as welcome staff, handed out information
sheets, and guided incoming people to the lines. The main
waiting line outside the school was divided into 6–18 parallel
lines inside the cafeteria. One check-in station existed for each
line. Each such station was staffed with one to three clerks,
who determined eligibility for persons by age and residency
requirements (self-reported). Two physicians supervised the
process. Vaccinees received vaccination cards and were
directed to continue to one of the 6–18 parallel vaccination
posts, located behind the check-in station. These posts were
equipped with skin disinfectants, Band-Aids, sharps contain-
ers, and coolers with prefilled vaccine syringes. Two to four
registered nurses staffed each vaccination post. A registered
nurse and a physician supervised the vaccinations. Registered
nurses prepared single-dose syringes in the cafeteria kitchen,
adjacent to the vaccination clinic. Three to 10 persons were
involved continuously in preparing the syringes. Syringes
were filled from the multidose vial, capped with new needles,
and stored in coolers. In a separate room adjacent to the vacci-
nation posts, the local fire department provided staff and
equipment for first aid and advanced life support. Two vac-
cinees needed first aid because of minor injuries, occurring as
a result of syncope before or shortly after vaccination. No
allergic reactions or injection site infections were reported dur-
ing the campaign or afterwards. One needlestick injury
occurred in a health-care worker.
Public Information
The state health department, county health department, and
school administration had difficulty coordinating the release of
information to the media and the public. Some elected officials
did not accept the targeted approach of the vaccination cam-
paign. Public anxiety resulting in part from inconsistent mes-
sages and disagreements among officials hampered efforts to
conduct the vaccination campaign as originally planned. The
toll-free information phone line registered over 5,000 calls in 7
days. In addition to the affected county health department,
health departments from neighboring counties also received
hundreds of phone calls each day during the outbreak.
Vaccination Coverage
The target population of 2- to 22-year-old residents of the
two neighboring towns was 10,132. A total of 13,535 persons
received the vaccine. Of these, 13,148 (97%) were vaccinated
during the first 3 days of the campaign; the remaining 387
(3%) were vaccinated by appointment at the health department
on January 5–20, 1999. Between 300 and 1,100 vaccinations
were given per hour. During maximum workload, 1,100 vacci-
nations were delivered per hour by approximately 78 workers
who staffed the 18 lines. According to the vaccination logs,
among the 13,148 persons who received vaccine during the
first 3 days, 10,076 (77%) belonged to the target population,
3,065 (23%) lived outside the target area, and 7 (<1%) were
older than the target age group (Tables 2 and 3). On the basis
of these numbers, vaccination coverage was 99% (10,076/
10,132). Vaccination coverage was lower in the age groups
15–20 and 21–22 years than in younger children (Table 3).
More than half of all persons in the target group received vac-
cine on day 1 of the mass campaign; 84% were immunized by
the end of day 2 and 96% after day 3 (Table 2).
Among those ages 5–17 with zip codes within the target
area (6,699), a sample of 191 (3%) vaccination records were
selected, and the names and addresses were compared to the
school enrollment database of the county. Among these, 165
(86%) matched in name and birthdate with records in the
Table 2. Vaccinations by day and target area, Putnam County, Florida, 1998–1999
Vaccination dates  Vaccinees within target area  Vaccinees outside target area Total vaccinees % of all vaccinees in target area 
12/30/98 5,398 229 5,627 96
12/31/98 3,393 656 4,049 84
1/2/99 1,292 2,180 3,472 37
Total first 3 days 10,083 3,065 13,148 77
1/2–20/99 363 24 387 94
Total 10,446 3,089 13,535 77Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 12, December 2002 1401
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school enrollment database. Of these records, 142 (86%) had
addresses within the target area in the school enrollment data-
base, while 23 (14%, 95% confidence interval 9% to 19%) had
addresses outside the target area. If 14% of the addresses for
the 10,076 vaccinees with addresses within the target area
were incorrect, approximately 8,664 vaccinees actually were
from the target area. The overall estimate for the vaccination
coverage for the first 3 days of the campaign would therefore
have been 86% (8,664/10,132).
Cost of Intervention
The cost of the public health response to the outbreak
amounted to approximately $370,000; 65% of this amount was
for the purchase and delivery of vaccine, 20% for personnel
costs to administer it, 6% for personnel cost involved in public
information, 5% for personnel cost for contact investigation
and chemoprophylaxis, and 4% for other expenses (Table 4).
The cost for the vaccination campaign alone totaled approxi-
mately $329,300 (vaccine, personnel for vaccine administra-
tion, and other expenses), resulting in a cost per vaccination of
approximately $24.
Discussion
Even accounting for incorrect addresses in the vaccination
registers, the vaccination coverage in this campaign was high.
Whether the vaccination campaign controlled the outbreak is
difficult to prove. The five cases that occurred after the cam-
paign had ended indicate that the population was under con-
tinuing exposure to the outbreak strain during the next year.
Nevertheless, this low number of subsequent cases suggests
that the vaccination campaign probably prevented additional
cases that could not have been prevented by chemoprophylaxis
alone (19–28). One of these cases was attributed to vaccine
failure. In other studies, vaccine efficacy has been estimated to
be approximately 85% (4). The size of the unvaccinated popu-
lation and the number of cases were too small to determine the
efficacy of vaccination in this campaign.
The outbreak response was organized within 24 hours after
the ACIP criteria were fulfilled and approximately 2 weeks
after the first case was reported. This response time compares
favorably to that in other vaccination campaigns in response to
community-based meningococcal disease outbreaks (3–
5,10,14,29).  Most mass vaccination campaigns designed in
response to community-based outbreaks tend to last more than
several weeks or months, which makes a comparison to our
results difficult (5,10,29). In England, a mass vaccination cam-
paign conducted in two communities lasted approximately 1
week; 8,320 and 7,660 vaccinations were given in each com-
munity, respectively (14). In a meningococcal disease out-
break in Illinois, 125–334 vaccinations were given per hour
with jet injectors; however, details were not described (30).
Compared with similar reports, providing over 13,000 vacci-
nations in 3 days and up to 1,100 vaccinations per hour indi-
cates that the intervention was an operational success
(5,10,30).
We targeted the vaccination campaign at 2- to 22-year-olds
because the vaccine is not effective in children <2 years and
because at the time the decision was made none of the patients
was >18 years old. We extended the upper age limit to 22 years
to include students of the local college since meningococcal
disease outbreaks frequently occur in college settings. While
the community seemed to accept the upper and lower age lim-
its for the target population, it did not comply well with the
geographic restriction. In retrospect, a more targeted approach
might be appropriate. However, enforcing a more focused vac-
cination strategy can be extremely difficult if interventions are
needed immediately and under extreme public pressure and
fear. The proportion of vaccinees from outside the target area
Table 3. Size of target population and number vaccinated by age 




No. (%) of target 
population vaccinateda 
Approximately 2–4 yrs 1,439 1,435 (100)
5–9 yrs 2,460 2,741 (111)
10–14 yrs 2,513 2,606 (104)
15–20 yrs 2,424 2,288 (94)
21–22 yrs 1,296 1,006 (78)
Total 10,132 10,076 (99)
aFigures >100% result from the fact that people outside the target population received 
vaccination.
Table 4. Cost of public health intervention to control meningococcal outbreak, Putnam County, Florida, 1998–1999a
Expenditure Estimated  working  hrsb Approximate cost (U.S.$) % of total cost of intervention
Purchase and delivery of the vaccine N/A 240,500 65
Personnel costs
Vaccine administration  4,000 74,000 20
Public information 1,200 22,200 6
Contact investigation 1,000 18,500 5
Other N/A 14,800 4
Total 6,200 370,000 100
aNA, not applicable.
bAverage cost per hour of a public health employee was estimated to be $18.50.RESEARCH
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increased each day. Comparison with the school enrollment
database showed that 14% of vaccinees had addresses outside
the target area. While recent address changes may have been a
factor, most of these likely claimed to live in the target area to
be eligible for the vaccine. 
Public pressure fueled in part by conflicting information
released by elected officials became so great that by the after-
noon of the 2nd vaccination day restricting vaccination to the
target population was impossible. As a result, on the 3rd day
most people who were vaccinated lived outside the target area.
In an outbreak described by Irwin et al., restricting the cam-
paign to the target population was also difficult (14). Limiting
the intervention to only 3 days probably helped to prevent mis-
targeting of resources, since additional vaccination days would
mainly have increased the number of vaccinees from outside
the target area. 
The effectiveness of chemoprophylaxis in outbreak control
has been questioned in previous meningococcal disease out-
breaks in Canada and the United Kingdom (9,10). One prob-
lem with chemoprophylaxis is that it is effective for a limited
period of time. Current recommendations provide guidance for
who should receive chemoprophylaxis, but these guidelines
can be difficult to implement (7,8,18). Various studies have
shown that household contacts are at greater risk of acquiring
meningococcal disease and would benefit most from chemo-
prophylaxis (18,21,22). However, the available evidence does
not always indicate who else should receive chemoprophylaxis
(6,18,21–28).  Twenty-five percent of those who received
chemoprophylaxis in this outbreak were not close contacts
according to the ACIP definition (7); however, chemoprophy-
laxis, especially in highly publicized cases, is often given to
people who do not fit the definition of a close contact
(9,18,19).
The automated toll-free information hot line proved to be
an efficient way to respond to the large number of calls from
concerned citizens. Confusion might have been avoided if all
telephone requests had been directed to only one location suf-
ficiently equipped with phone lines and personnel. We did not
brief some of the elected officials early enough to ensure con-
sistent release of information to the public. However, the
major problem was the failure of some community leaders to
support the targeted approach for vaccination. Similar situa-
tions have been described with other vaccination campaigns
(12,13,29). The importance of having a close, ongoing rela-
tionship between public health and other community leaders
cannot be overemphasized. When public health officials have
the trust, confidence, and appreciation of other leaders, com-
municating a unified message is more likely. The circum-
stances of this outbreak were similar to those expected in the
event of a bioterrorist attack, where rapid intervention is
required, and the lessons from this outbreak response will be
used in Florida to plan for such an event.
The public health response to this outbreak involved con-
siderable expense. In addition to the costs to the health depart-
ment for personnel and material, the contributions of other
state and county agencies, as well as individual volunteers,
were substantial. During a school-based vaccination campaign
against meningococcal disease in Illinois, approximately
$22.50 was spent per vaccination, which is close to our esti-
mate (30). However, during a mass vaccination campaign in
the state of Washington, the cost for vaccine administration
alone was estimated to be $20 per vaccinee, not including the
cost of the vaccine (29). Estimating the cost of future interven-
tions of this type will need to take into account the fact that 50-
dose vaccine vials, such as used in this campaign, are no
longer available in the United States. The difference in cost is
substantial; if we had used 10-dose vials, the cost for the vac-
cine alone would have increased by approximately 80% to
$440,000. This additional cost would have resulted in a cost
per vaccinee of $39.
Our decision to implement a vaccination campaign fol-
lowed ACIP criteria based on epidemiologic and laboratory
information. Keeping the public, elected officials, health-care
providers, neighboring health departments, and the media
informed should be a priority. The vaccination campaign
should be confined to the target population to ensure that high
vaccination coverage is accomplished early among those most
at risk. Based on our experience, providing vaccinations at a
single site and in a short time period to maintain control over
the operation and conserve resources seems preferable. 
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